Avoid a Digital Disaster: Domain Hijacking Prevention and Response in 2025

Your domain is one of the most critical parts of your online presence. It’s how users find you, trust you, and interact with your brand. But what happens when someone else takes control of it? Domain hijacking is no longer rare. Attackers are finding loopholes in registrar systems, using phishing, and exploiting weak access points to quietly steal domains and misuse them.

In this blog, we’ll break down how domain hijacking actually happens, how it’s different from DNS hijacking and spoofing, and what steps you can take to protect and recover your domain before the damage is done.

Introduction

According to Wikipedia, in early 2024, over 8,000 domains and 13,000 subdomains linked to brands like eBay, McAfee, Marvel, and Pearson were hijacked through registrar-level compromises, fueling massive spam and phishing campaigns. This alarming trend shows how domain hijacking has become a serious and often underestimated threat in today’s digital landscape.

Domain hijacking refers to the unauthorized takeover of a registered domain name, often through compromised registrar accounts, phishing attacks, or social engineering. Once hijacked, attackers can reroute traffic to fake sites, steal customer data, distribute malware, or even demand ransom. It’s more than a technical breach; it directly impacts your brand reputation, legal standing, and operational continuity.

Domain Hijacking Vs DNS Hijacking Vs Domain Spoofing

Aspect	Domain Hijacking	DNS Hijacking	Domain Spoofing
Definition	Unauthorized takeover of a domain name at the registrar level	Tampering with DNS records to redirect traffic	Faking a domain’s identity via lookalike websites or emails
Attacker’s Access	Full control of the domain (registrar account access)	Access to DNS settings or resolver manipulation	No actual access to the domain or DNS
How It Happens	Phishing, social engineering, email compromise, weak registrar security	Malware, DNS cache poisoning, router exploits	Imitation of domain in emails/URLs (e.g., using “paypa1.com” instead of “paypal.com”)
Main Goal	Steal or control the domain for ransom, phishing, or impersonation	Redirect users to malicious websites	Trick users into thinking they are interacting with the legitimate domain
Impact	Total loss of domain control, brand damage, legal risks	Data theft, phishing, malware distribution	Loss of user trust, phishing attacks, brand reputation damage
Ownership Change?	Yes, the attacker takes over the registrar account or transfers the domain	No, domain still belongs to original owner	No, attacker only mimics the domain
Technical Breach?	Yes	Yes	No
Visibility	Often unnoticed until major damage is done	Hard to detect unless DNS is monitored	May go unnoticed by users unless they’re trained
Protection Methods	Registrar lock, strong email security, 2FA, WHOIS privacy	DNSSEC, secure DNS providers, router hardening	DMARC, SPF, DKIM, user education, email security tools

Let’s clarify something important so you don’t get confused by similar-sounding threats. Domain hijacking is not the same as DNS hijacking or domain spoofing, and understanding the difference is critical. When we talk about domain hijacking, we’re referring to a situation where an attacker gains full control over your domain name, often by exploiting weak registrar security or stealing login credentials.

In contrast, DNS hijacking only alters the route your traffic takes by tampering with DNS records, the attacker doesn’t own your domain, but they can redirect visitors to malicious websites. Then there’s domain spoofing, which doesn’t require any technical breach at all. Instead, attackers create fake websites or emails that look like they’re from your domain, tricking users without ever touching your actual infrastructure.

Now that you can clearly separate domain hijacking from DNS hijacking and spoofing, let’s take a step further and understand what’s actually being targeted in a hijack and who controls it. Let’s take a look at the infrastructure behind domain ownership, specifically the roles played by domain registrars and registries. This foundation will help you see exactly where attackers slip in and how the domain ecosystem itself can either protect or expose you.

Understanding the roles of Registries and Registrars

Every domain on the internet whether it’s .com, .org, or .in is managed under the oversight of a domain name registry, an organization responsible for maintaining all domains under a specific top-level domain (TLD). These registries operate under the authority of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). For example, Verisign manages .com and .net, while Public Interest Registry handles .org, and regional registries manage country-specific domains like .io or .co.uk.

However, registries don’t typically sell domains directly to the public. That job is done by domain name registrars, ICANN-accredited companies like GoDaddy, Namecheap, or Google Domains that are authorized to handle domain registrations, ownership records, DNS configuration, and domain transfers.

What’s less obvious is that many registrars subcontract to non-accredited resellers. For example, a small IT company might offer domain registration services through a reseller arrangement with a larger registrar like Tucows or Enom. One real-world example is Hover, a popular domain service that actually operates as a reseller under Tucows, which is the ICANN-accredited entity. These reseller layers introduce complexity and increase third- and even fourth-party risks, especially when a domain dispute or hijacking occurs because you may not be interacting directly with the accredited entity holding your domain record.
While domain registration is relatively straightforward, domain transfers between registrars are often surprisingly quick and frictionless. In many cases, all an attacker needs is:

• Access to the domain owner’s email account
• The EPP (Extensible Provisioning Protocol) code, a sort of transfer password issued by the current registrar
• The ability to approve the transfer request sent by email

Once approved, the domain can be moved from one registrar (say, Namecheap) to another (like Google Domains) in as little as five days or even instantly, depending on the TLD and the policies of both registrars. While this flexibility is great for users looking for better pricing or support, it also creates an opportunity for attackers especially when registrars vary significantly in how strictly they verify ownership during transfer requests.

In practice, if an attacker compromises your email and initiates a transfer, the domain may change hands before you even notice something is wrong. Worse, if your domain is managed by a reseller or through a web agency, it might take even longer to detect and respond to suspicious activity.

This fluidity in domain ownership and the involvement of multiple intermediaries is exactly what makes domain hijacking feasible. In the next section, we’ll break down how attackers exploit this process step by step to take over your domain without ever setting off an alarm.

How Cybercriminals Hijack the Domain?

1. Targeting the Domain

Hijackers don’t strike at random. They often begin by identifying domains that are both high-value and poorly protected. These might be domains nearing expiration, those with exposed WHOIS data, or domains registered through smaller registrars or resellers. Well-known brands, customer-facing portals, and vendors with access to sensitive data are prime targets.

2. Initial Access: Phishing, Malware & Social Engineering

The attacker’s next goal is to gain access to the domain registrar account or the admin email tied to it. Phishing remains the most common method, where fake emails impersonating registrar platforms trick users into giving up credentials. Others deploy malware or keyloggers to silently harvest login information. Some even contact registrar support directly, using social engineering to impersonate the domain owner and bypass basic identity checks.

3. Email Compromise: The Weakest Link

Since domain transfers and registrar actions are typically confirmed via email, gaining access to the admin email account can be as dangerous as compromising the registrar itself. Many organizations still use easily guessable or generic inboxes like [email protected], often without multi-factor authentication making them easy targets.

4. Harvesting the EPP Code

With access secured, the attacker retrieves the EPP (Extensible Provisioning Protocol) code that is a unique key required to authorize a domain transfer. If the domain account lacks extra authentication or alerts, the attacker can request and receive this code without raising suspicion.

5. Transferring the Domain

The attacker now initiates a domain transfer to a new registrar, typically one with weaker security or recovery protocols. If the domain isn’t locked, the transfer can be completed in as little as 5 days, or even faster for certain TLDs. The process often happens in the background, giving the attacker a head start before the rightful owner notices.

6. Taking Control and Covering Tracks

Once the domain changes hands, the attacker acts quickly. They update WHOIS records, enable privacy protections, and change DNS settings to either redirect traffic, impersonate the brand, or deploy phishing pages. In some cases, the hijacked domain is sold on underground forums or held for ransom. By the time the owner realizes what happened, the attacker has already buried their tracks.

As you’ve seen, attackers exploit not just technical flaws, but also human error, weak registrar policies, and overlooked email security. Fortunately, most domain hijacks are preventable but only if the right precautions are in place before the threat strikes.

Best Practices to Prevent Domain Hijacking

 To truly protect your domain, you need to cover human error, email-based threats, and technical loopholes. Below are four core areas where preventive practices can drastically reduce the risk.

1. Secure Your Email & Access Points

Since most domain takeovers begin with a compromised email account or stolen credentials, this is your first line of defense.

• Enable Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): If your registrar supports 2FA, turn it on always. It adds a second barrier, even if someone manages to steal your password.
  
• Use Strong, Unique Passwords: Avoid using the same password across platforms. Passwords should be long, random, and stored securely (use a password manager).
  
• Monitor Breaches and Rotate Passwords: If you hear of a data breach involving a platform you use, update your domain-related credentials immediately even if they weren’t directly exposed.
  
• Don’t Share Registrar Login Credentials: Sharing access to your domain control panel is like giving someone your house keys and alarm code. If collaboration is required, create separate user roles or use DNS delegation.

2. Guard Against Phishing & Social Engineering

Attackers often pose as trusted entities or your registrar to trick you into giving away control.

• Be Suspicious of Login Requests via Email: Always access your registrar’s website directly never click on email links asking you to “verify” or “log in.”
  
• Use WHOIS Privacy Protection: WHOIS information (email, phone, address) can be used for spear-phishing and impersonation. Use WHOIS privacy to hide this data from public view.
  
• Keep Your Contact Info Up to Date: Expired or inactive email addresses tied to your domain are goldmines for attackers. Always maintain a live, secure admin email for registrar communication.

3. Fortify Your Domain at the Registrar Level

Your domain registrar is the gatekeeper. Weak registrar security opens doors for attackers.

• Choose a Trusted, ICANN-Accredited Registrar: Always go with reputable registrars like GoDaddy, Namecheap, Squarespace Domains, etc., and avoid non-accredited resellers. They offer better transfer protection, support, and logging.
  
• Enable Domain Lock & Account Lock: Domain locking prevents unauthorized transfer requests, and account locking limits login attempts, helping block brute-force attacks.
  
• Use Registrars That Support Registry Lock and 24×7 Alerts: This gives an added layer of assurance in case someone tries to alter your domain settings.

4. Maintain Operational Resilience

Even without an attacker, domains can be lost due to negligence or expiration. These final practices help ensure continuity.

• Enable Auto-Renewal: One of the simplest ways to lose a domain is letting it expire. Enabling auto-renewal prevents unintentional lapses.
  
• Don’t Register & Host with the Same Company: Diversifying your providers (domain registrar vs. hosting company) reduces the blast radius if one of them is compromised.
  
• Understand EPP & the 60-Day Transfer Policy: ICANN enforces a 60-day wait after ownership changes to slow down hijacks. Know your registrar’s rules and how EPP codes work. Keeping this process in check makes hijacking harder and easier to detect.

Even with the best precautions in place, no system is completely immune. If a domain hijack does occur, the damage can be immediate but it doesn’t have to be permanent. Recovering a stolen domain requires swift action, a clear understanding of your registrar’s policies, and in some cases, legal intervention or escalation through ICANN. 

How to Recover Domain Hijacking?

Recovery is often a combination of technical action, registrar coordination, and sometimes legal escalation. Here’s what the process typically involves:

1. Act Immediately: Contact Your Registrar

The moment you suspect your domain has been hijacked whether the website goes down, DNS settings are changed, or you lose control of your registrar account, contact your registrar’s support team immediately. Provide:

• Proof of ownership (original registration emails, WHOIS records, billing receipts)
• A clear timeline of suspicious activity
• Any communication from attackers (if ransom or phishing is involved)

Most registrars have an abuse or recovery team dedicated to such incidents, and fast reporting can prevent further changes like additional transfers or WHOIS obfuscation.

2. Attempt Domain Rollback or Lockdown

If your registrar still controls the domain, they may be able to revert changes, lock the domain, or freeze the account to prevent further damage. If the domain has already been transferred to a different registrar, you can initiate a Registrar Transfer Dispute (next step).

Some TLDs also allow a “registry lock” at the registry level (not just the registrar) which adds barrier. Enabling this after recovery is strongly advised.

3. File a Dispute with ICANN or the Gaining Registrar

If the domain was successfully transferred away:

• You can file a complaint with ICANN, under the Registrar Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy (TDRP).
• If there’s a legal or trademark angle (such as brand impersonation), you can escalate the case through UDRP (Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy) for arbitration.

You’ll need to demonstrate prior ownership and document how the transfer occurred without proper authorization. Legal teams may be required, especially if the new registrar is in a different country.

4. Submit a UDRP Complaint (If Applicable)

The UDRP process allows trademark holders or legitimate owners to file a case against bad-faith domain registrants including hijackers. While this is not a “quick fix,” it’s a powerful tool in situations where:

• The hijacked domain is being used for fraud or phishing
• You own a trademark for the domain
• The attacker is unresponsive or anonymous

If successful, the domain can be returned to you without going through court.

5. Legal Action (as a Last Resort)

If registrar-level and ICANN-level remedies fail, or if you’re dealing with ransomware/extortion, you may need to escalate to local law enforcement or file a civil lawsuit. Courts can order domain restoration if proper evidence of ownership and abuse is presented, especially if the domain is linked to a business or IP asset.

Though legal paths can be time-consuming and expensive, keep detailed logs, WHOIS history, registrar communication, and proof of domain use to strengthen your case.

You can also read – 5 Steps to Take When a Data Breach Hits You

 ICANN to the Rescue: TDRP vs. UDRP

When your domain has been hijacked, and your registrar is either unresponsive or unable to help, ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) provides two major dispute resolution frameworks: TDRP and UDRP. While they serve different purposes, both can play a crucial role in recovering your domain depending on how the hijack occurred.

TDRP (Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy)

TDRP is used when your domain was transferred to another registrar without proper authorization which is a common outcome of hijacking. This policy allows your original registrar to file a complaint on your behalf with the registry, requesting a reversal of the transfer.TDRP is time-sensitive, usually the complaint must be filed within 6 to 12 months of the unauthorized transfer. It’s ideal when the hijack is caught early and involves registrar-side failures.

UDRP (Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy)

UDRP comes into play when the dispute isn’t just about a registrar transfer but involves trademark abuse or bad-faith registration like when an attacker hijacks your domain and uses it to impersonate your brand or redirect traffic.
UDRP is more formal than TDRP and can take several weeks to months, but it’s often the most powerful tool when legal rights to a domain are in question especially for businesses with trademarks or established brand presence.

Reverse Domain Hijacking: Misusing the Legal System

While domain hijacking involves a bad actor stealing a legitimate domain, reverse domain hijacking (RDH) flips the script. It’s when a company or individual misuses the UDRP process to wrongfully take over a domain from its rightful owner.

Often, this involves a larger company targeting a small registrant, claiming trademark infringement even when the domain was purchased fairly and used in good faith. It’s a legal tactic used to intimidate or pressure owners into surrendering valuable domains, especially if they lack legal resources to fight back.

ICANN and arbitration panels frown upon RDH, and cases where it’s proven may result in the complaint being denied but the process still costs time, money, and emotional energy. The takeaway? Whether you’re defending or recovering a domain, legal strategy and early digital risk mitigation matter.

Don’t Let Domain Become your weakest link in Cybersecurity

Your domain isn’t just a URL, it’s your digital brand, your reputation, and the foundation of your online trust. A hijacked domain can mean immediate disruption, financial loss, loss of customer trust, legal consequences, and long recovery battles. The scariest part? Most successful hijacks don’t rely on sophisticated zero-day exploits. They happen because of overlooked misconfigurations, weak access points, or insecure third-party connections.

In other words, your domain is part of your attack surface and if it’s not being actively managed, it’s vulnerable.

That’s where Tikaj comes in. Through our advanced cybersecurity platform Hunto.ai, we help you to:

• Monitor your domains and subdomains in real time
  
• Detect unauthorized DNS changes and impersonation attempts
  
• Identify exposed registrar, email, and third-party risks
  
• Respond quickly to hijacks, phishing abuse, or spoofing
  
• Integrate domain security into your attack surface management (ASM) strategy
  

Attackers see your domain as an entry point. We see it as your first line of defense.

Get in touch with Tikaj and let Hunto.ai help you take control of your digital identity before someone else does.

FAQs

1. What is domain hijacking?

Domain hijacking is the unauthorized takeover of a domain name, usually through phishing, weak registrar security, or email compromise. Once hijacked, attackers can control your website, emails, and online brand presence.

2. How is domain hijacking different from DNS hijacking and domain spoofing?

• Domain hijacking gives attackers full control of your domain.
• DNS hijacking alters DNS settings to redirect traffic without owning the domain.
• Domain spoofing involves fake websites or emails pretending to be from your domain without accessing it.

3. How can I protect my domain from being hijacked?

Use a strong registrar, enable two-factor authentication, lock your domain, secure your admin email, and use WHOIS privacy. Regular monitoring and access control are key to preventing hijacks.

4. Is domain hijacking the same as DNS hijacking?

No. Domain hijacking involves stealing the entire domain ownership. DNS hijacking manipulates the DNS settings to redirect traffic without actually taking control of the domain.